Abstract-Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive that simultaneously realizes both the functions of public key encryption and digital signature in a logically single step, and with a cost significantly lower than that required by the traditional "signature and encryption" approach. Recently, an efficient certificateless signcryption scheme without using bilinear pairings was proposed by Zhu et al., which is claimed secure based on the assumptions that the compute DiffieHellman problem and the discrete logarithm problem are difficult. Although some security arguments were provided to show the scheme is secure, in this paper, we find that the signcryption construction due to Zhu et al. is not as secure as claimed. Specifically, we describe an adversary that can break the IND-CCA2 security of the scheme without any Unsigncryption query. Moreover, we demonstrate that the scheme is insecure against key replacement attack by describing a concrete attack approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of signcryption was firstly introduced by Zheng in 1997 [1] , where the functions of both digital signature and public encryption can be achieved simultaneously in a locally single step. This new primitive enables less cost than "signature followed by encryption" approach in computation and communication overhead. Subsequently, Baek et al. [2] formalized the security notions for secure signcryption, and Malone-Lee [3] developed the first identity-based signcryption and claimed that their construction achieves both privacy and unforgeability. Unfortunately, Libert et al. [4] pointed out that the proposal due to Manlone-Lee in [3] is not semantically secure, since the signature of the message is not hidden in the signcryption ciphertext. Chow et al. [5] presented an identity-based signcryption algorithm with public verifiability and forward security. At the same time, based on the security model in [3] , Boyen extended the security model and supplemented three new security notions, namely, ciphertext unlinkability, ciphertext authentication and ciphertext anonymity in [6] . Signcryption has been a research spot in information security and many constructions have been given. Readers are referred to the review of practical signcryption due to Dent and Zheng.
Certificateless cryptography was invented by Al-Riyami and Paterson in 2003 and this novel primitive has very appealing features. That is, it does not require any public key certification employed in traditional Public Key Cryptography, nor having key escrow problem in identity-based cryptography. Al-Riyami and Paterson constructed certificateless public key encryption and and certificateless digital signature scheme, both of which are based on the bilinear pairing used in Boneh and Franklin's identity-based encryption scheme. By combining signcryption and certificateless cryptography, in 2010, Zhu et al. proposed an efficient certificateless signcryption scheme [8] without using bilinear pairings. The construction was claimed proven secure in the random oracle model based on computational Diffie-Hellman assumption and the discrete logarithm assumption and the proposed scheme also achieves the security properties of confidentiality, non-forgeability, publicly verifiability, nonrepudiation and perfect forward security, etc. Moreover, the implementation of the proposed scheme only requires three times exponent operations and without any bilinear pair ing operation. Compared with other existing certificateless signcryption schemes in the computational complexity, the proposed scheme is more efficient . However, in this paper, we demonstrate that the scheme in is not secure against IND-CCA2 adversary and key replacement adversary. The detailed security analysis are given in this paper to show an adversary that can break the IND-CCA2 security of the scheme without any Unsigncryption query, and an adversary can forge a valid signcryption ciphertext by replacing the public key of a sender.
Organization: The rest of this paper are organized as follows. Section 2 and Section 3 respectively present "certificateless signcryption scheme model" and "security definition" mentioned in original paper [8] ; We review Zhu et al.'s certificateless signcryption scheme based on discrete logarithm in Section 4; Section 5 shows the detailed security analysis on Zhu et al.'s scheme; Section 6 conclude the paper.
II. CERTIFICATELESS SIGNCRYPTION SCHEME MODEL
A certificateless signcryption scheme contains three legal participators: signcryptor S, receiver V and private key generator PKG. It is made up of the following algorithms: Setup. Iutput security parameter k, PKG outputs system master key x and system parameter params. PartialKeyExtract. Input system parameter params, master key x and user's identity ID u , PKG outputs sigher's partial public key P P u and partial private key P S u . SetSecretValue. Input params and user's ID, user outputs secret value s u . PrivateKeyExtract. Input params and user's ID,P S u and s u , user outputs private key SK u . PublicKeyExtract. Input params and user's ID,P P u and s u , user outputs private key P K u . SignCrypt. Input params, message m, signer's ID s and private key SK s , receiver's ID v and public key P K v , user outputs ciphertext σ. UnSignCrypt. Input params, σ, ID s and public key SK s , receiver's ID v and private key SK v , if the verification passes, outputs m; otherwise, verification fails. The algorithm above needs to satisfy the following requests:
III. SECURITY DEFINITION
A certificateless system is confronted with two kinds of attacks. Attack 1: the third-party attacker can utilize all users' public keys to attack the scheme, otherwise, attacker can exchange all users' public key; Attack 2: the third-party attacker can obtain the master key of the system to attack the scheme, while attacker cannot exchange the user's public key. Meanwhile, certificateless signcryption scheme should have the security against the adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack and the unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attack. Definition 1. Security against attack 1.If no any polynomialbounded adversary Adv 1 will win the following game with no-negligible advantage, the certificateless signcryption scheme is indistinguishable against adaptive chosenciphertext attack. 1. Challenger C inputs secure parameter k,runs Setup and sends system parameter params to adversary Adv 1 . 2. In the searching phase,adversary Adv 1 can perform the followings: 1) PartialKeyExtract Queries: Adv 1 chooses a identity ID u , challenger C computes (P P u , P S u ) ← P artialKeyExtract(params, x, ID u ),and sends it to Adv 1 ; 2) PrivateKeyExtract Queries: Adv 1 chooses a identity ID u , challenger C computes P S u ← P artialKeyExtract(params, x, ID u ), s u ← SetSecretV alue(params), SK u ← P rivateKeyExtract(params, P S u , ID u , s u ), and sends SK u to Adv 1 ; 3) PublicKeyExtract Queries: Adv chooses a identity ID u , challenger C computes (P P u ← P artialKeyExtract(params, x, ID u ), s u ← SetSecretV alue(params) , P K u ← P ublicKeyExtract(params, P P u , ID u , s u ) and sends P K u to Adv.
4)
with the same length and two challenging identities ID a , ID b ,ID b cannot be the identity which has performed PartialKeyExtract Queries or PrivateKeyExtract Queries, C randomly chooses j ∈ 0, 1, calculates σ = Signcrypt(m j , SK a , P K b ), and sends σ to Adv 1 . 4.In the guess phase, Adv 1 performes queries as 2 with polynomial-bounded times, however, it cannot perform PartialKeyExtract Queries or PrivateKeyExtract Queries for ID b , and cannot runs Unsigncrypt Queries for ciphertext σ. 5.In the end, Adv 1 outputs a value j as the guess of j, if j = j, then Adv 1 wins the game. Definition 2. Security against attack 2. If no any polynomial-bounded adversary Adv 2 will win the following game with no-negligible advantage, the certificateless signcryption scheme is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack. 1. Challenger C inputs secure parameter k,runs Setup and sends system parameter params and x to adversary Adv 2 ; 2. In the searching phase, adversary Adv 2 can perform all queries in the Definition 1 but PublicKeyExchange; 3. The challenge phase and guess phase are the same with Definition 1; 4. In the end, Adv 2 outputs a value j as the guess of j, if j = j, then Adv 2 wins the game. Definition 3. Unforgeability against attack 1.If no any polynomial-bounded adversary Adv 1 will win the following game with no-negligible advantage, the certificateless signcryption scheme is unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attack. 
IV. SECURITY AYALYSIS OF A CERTIFICATELESS SIGNCRYPTION SCHEME
In this section, we will first review the certificateless signcryption scheme based on discrete logarithm proposed in [8] . Then, we provide the detailed security analysis of the scheme.
A. Review of the scheme
The certificateless signcryption scheme based on discrete logarithm contains the following algorithms. 1. Setup. Input parameter k, generate two prime number p and q, q|p − 1, g is a generator of group Z * p with the order of q, a secure Hash function,
n , n is the length of plaintext. KGC chooses randomly a master key x ∈ Z * q , calculates y = g x , public parameters are {p, q, g, y, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 }. 2.PartialKeyExtract. Given identity ID u , KGC chooses randomly s u ∈ Z * q , calculates w u = g su , t u = s u + xH 1 {ID u , w u }, where t u is user's partial private key P S u , w u is user's partial public key P P u . 3.PrivateKeyExtract. Given identity ID u and partial private key P S u , user chooses randomly z u ∈ Z * q as the secret value, generates user's private key SK u = (t u , z u ). 4.PublicKeyExtract. Given identity ID u and partial private key P P u and z u , user computes u u = g zu , generates public key P K u = (w u , u u ). 5.SignCrypt. When Alice sends message m to Bob, Alice will do as follows: 1) Chooses randomly r ∈ Z * q , R = g r ; 2) Calculates
3) Sends message σ = {h, s, c} to Bob. 6.UnSignCrypt. After receiving ciphertext σ, Bob will do as follows:
, ID a } = h holds, Bob receives message m.
B. Security analysis of the scheme
In this section, we will show that the scheme described above is not secure against CCA adversary attack and key replacement attack.
CCA security analysis: CCA2 security in certificateless signcryption says that even an adversary can perform polynomial PartialKeyExtract queries, PrivateKeyExtract queries, PublicKeyExtract queries, and Unsigncrypt queries, given a signcryption ciphertext and two plaintexts m 0 and m 1 , he cannot tell the ciphertext is on m 0 or m 1 . Unfortunately, below we will show an adversary is able to violate CCA security.
1) The adversary picks a plaintext m b (b ∈ {0, 1}) randomly, say he chooses m 0 . 2) Give a signcryption ciphertext, the adversary checks if
, ID a } = h holds. If the equation holds, the signcrypted message is m 0 ; Otherwise, the signcrypted message is m 1 ; Key replacement attack: This kind of attack says that, an adversary is able to substitute a sender's public key, and then forge a valid signcrypted ciphertext of a sender. In the following, we specify a malicious receiver public key (w b , u b ) and private key (t b , z b ) who can forge a valid signcrypted ciphertext (σ * = (g * , s * , c * )) of any plaintext m * by replacing the public key of the sender. Assume the sender's identity is ID a and his public key is (w a , u a ) and private key (t a , z a ).
1) Choose random elements
We can see that (σ * = (h * , s * , c * )) is a valid signcrypted ciphertext on m * of the sender with identity ID a .
In the UnsignCrypt, Bob receives the ciphertext σ * , he can recover the message: = R, so it satisfies H 2 (m, (u a w a y h3 g h ) s , ID a ) = h. Therefore, Bob can receive the message m. The attack described above shows that adversary, a malicious receiver, can replace the key of a sender to forge a valid ciphertext on any plaintext m.
V. CONCLUSION
Zhu et al. proposed an efficient certificateless signcryption scheme without using bilinear pairings, which is claimed secure based on the assumptions that the compute DiffieHellman problem and the discrete logarithm problem are difficult. However, it is not as secure as claimed. In this paper, we show that the scheme is not secure against key replacement attack and even chosen plaintext attack.
